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1043 
TIVO AND THE INCENTIVE/DISSEMINATION 
CONFLICT: THE ECONOMICS OF EXTENDING 
BETAMAX TO PERSONAL VIDEO RECORDERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Proprietary rights in intellectual property are an issue of growing 
concern with each major technological advancement. Protection for those 
proprietary rights can be found in the United States Constitution: “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 Intellectual 
property law can be divided into three distinct categories of copyrights, 
patents and trademarks, each protecting a different subject matter and each 
working toward a different social goal.2 Copyright laws are specifically 
designed to protect expressive works and to provide incentives for authors 
to create such works.3 These incentives include the possibility of 
remuneration that “prompts authors to produce and distribute work, 
thereby serving the public interest in the advancement and dissemination 
of science and art.”4 Each major innovation invites Congress and the 
courts to reexamine whether copyright protection should be afforded.5 
The issue of copyright infringement with respect to recording devices 
was first considered by the Supreme Court in 1984 in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (“Betamax”).6 In Betamax, the 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual 
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1465 (2002). This Note will focus strictly on the copyright aspect of 
intellectual property law. 
 3. Id. at 1465-66. Trademark law protects information about the source of goods and products, 
while patent law protects functional products, processes, and designs. Id. at 1465. In order to be 
protected by copyright law, works must be “original, minimally creative, and fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.” Id. 
 Information is a non-rival or public good, meaning once the good is provided to one, it costs 
nothing extra for any other person to consume the good. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 61 (5th 
ed. 1999). See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text for an in-depth explanation of public goods.  
 4. Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory 
Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 454 (2002). Copyright law is “intended definitely to 
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to 
afford greater encouragement to the protection of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the 
world.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 5. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology, in 
CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 113 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).  
 6. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Betamax]. 
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Court held that sale of Betamax video tape recorders (“VTRs”), which 
could be used by consumers to tape copyrighted programs, was not 
contributory copyright infringement by the producers of the VTRs.7 Most 
significantly, the practice of time-shifting, or recording a program to view 
it at a later time, only to erase that program soon after, was ruled to be a 
legitimate and fair use of the VTR.8  
Aside from the Court’s sound intellectual property analysis, its decision 
was correct under neoclassical economic theory.9 The copyright owner, 
Universal, benefited from the advertisers’ willingness to pay more for the 
larger audience, which was now able to watch programs shown at 
otherwise inconvenient times as a result of such time-shifting.10 This 
reasoning, however, assumes that time-shifting results merely in 
postponed, rather than eliminated, viewing of commercials.11  
Over the years since the development of the original VTR, TiVo and 
SonicBlue, makers of Replay TV, have each developed new recording 
devices called Personal Video Recorders (PVRs) that erase commercials 
before the viewer sees them.12 The ability of viewers to record television 
programs without the accompanying advertisements now renders incorrect 
 
 
 7. Id. at 438-42. The divided Court based its decision on the fair use exception to the 1976 
Copyright Act, stating that because Betamax was “capable of commercially significant noninfringing 
uses,” Sony’s sale of the device did not constitute contributory copyright infringement. Id. at 442, 456. 
See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  
 8. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 442. See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the Court’s analysis of authorized and unauthorized time-shifting, both of which were found by the 
Court to fall under the fair use exception.  
 9. See generally EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 16 (1982). 
Economics is generally concerned with scarcity, or the limits on the available means to influence 
society’s welfare. Id. Two important assumptions characterize, in part, the neoclassical model. Id. at 
17. First, the model assumes that individuals are always able to judge their own welfare, and therefore 
rules out systems such as dictatorships in which some members decide what is best for others. Id. 
Second, the model assumes that individuals’ judgments are rational, or not dependent on the welfare of 
others and rules out non-rationalities, such as jealousy. Id. In reality, individuals’ intentions to act 
rationally are limited by cognitive bounds on their ability to do so. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 7 (3d ed. 1999). See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 5 (1996) for examples of typical assumptions that define rational individuals. One 
criterion for comparing the outcomes of different economic models is the notion of Pareto efficiency, a 
goal which is usually desirable but not always attainable. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 15 (5th ed. 1999). Pareto efficiency, also known as 
“Pareto improvement” or “Pareto superiority”, is present when at least one person involved in the 
transaction is made better off, and more importantly, no one is made worse off. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998).  
 10. POSNER, supra note 9, at 48.  
 11. See generally id. 
 12. Amy Harmon, Skip-the-Ads Has Madison Ave. Upset, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2002, at A1. See 
also Suzanne Kantra Kirschner, Personal Digital Video Recorders, POPULAR SCIENCE, Mar. 2000, at 
83 for further explanation of the mechanics behind PVRs. 
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the assumption that time-shifting results only in postponed viewing of 
commercials.13  
In October 2001, major network television studios, including ABC, 
NBC, CBS, Disney, and Paramount Pictures (the “studios”), collectively 
filed a lawsuit in California Federal District Court against SonicBlue for 
copyright infringement.14 The studios argued that the current version of 
Replay TV “would deprive them of revenue and reduce their incentive to 
create programming.”15 The studios complained that SonicBlue’s 
commercial-skipping and file-sharing features amounted to contributory 
copyright infringement,16 a claim similar to the one originally set forth in 
the Betamax case.17 In order to prevent the court from applying the 
Supreme Court’s Betamax ruling, the studios must prove that ReplayTV is 
fundamentally different from the VTR.18  
Part II of this Note will examine the history of Betamax, as well as 
describe the differences between the VTR technology at issue in Betamax 
and more recent PVR technology. Using economic theory, Part III of this 
Note will address the Court’s holding in Betamax. Part IV of this Note will 
explain the ramifications of extending the Betamax holding to technology 
such as TiVo and ReplayTV. Finally, Part V of this Note will explain why, 
should the issue face the Court again, it should decline to extend the 
Betamax holding to the recent lawsuit against SonicBlue, and instead 
impose a compulsory license or per-unit tax on the monthly fee that 
customers already pay for PVR service.  
 
 
 13. See Harmon, supra note 12, at A1. Owners of PVRs see fewer than half of the commercials 
they saw before purchasing the PVR. Id. In addition, twenty percent of people who own TiVos or 
ReplayTVs admit to never watching any commercials. Id. (citing survey from NextResearch, 
Memphis, Tenn.). 
 14. Laurie J. Flynn, Networks See Threat in New Video Recorder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at 
C4. At a related press conference, former Turner Broadcasting Chairman and CEO, Jamie Kellner, 
stated: “[Skipping commercials is] theft. Your contract with your network when you get the show is 
you’re going to watch the spots. Otherwise you couldn’t get the show on an ad-supported basis. Any 
time you skip a commercial . . . you’re actually stealing the programming.” Chris Sprigman, Are 
Personal Video Recorders, Such As ReplayTV and TiVo, Copyright-Infringement Devices?: A Lawsuit 
Raising the Question May Force SonicBlue to Spy on PVR Users, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020509_sprigman.html. See also Paramount Pictures 
Corp. v. ReplayTV & SonicBlue Complaint (Oct. 30, 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/ 
Paramount_v_ReplayTV/20011031_complaint.html (Oct. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Paramount Pictures 
Corp.] for the actual complaint filed by the studios.  
 15. Flynn, supra note 14, at C4. 
 16. Paramount Pictures Corp. supra note 14. 
 17. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (D.C. Cal. 
1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), reaff’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 18. Flynn, supra note 14, at C4. 
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II. HISTORY 
A. VTR Technology: Betamax 
When the studios first sued Sony in 1979, the company’s Betamax 
VTR cost between $875 and $1000.19 For a user to record programs off-air 
and play them back on a regular television set, he or she needed three 
components: a videotape recorder, a tuner, and a radio frequency (“RF”) 
adapter.20 All three of these devices were found in the Betamax.21 Because 
only those three components were necessary, aspiring persons could 
assemble their own machine to allow off-air recording and on-television 
play back without purchasing the Betamax.22 The sophistication of the 
Betamax tuner and RF adapter also allowed users to record one show 
while viewing another, or to record a show while not viewing television at 
all.23 Recording away from home was made even easier by a timer, which 
could be automatically activated at a time specified by the owner.24 
In addition, the Betamax VTR contained two additional features: pause 
and fast-forward capability.25 The pause feature, when used while 
recording, allowed a viewer to omit any segment he or she did not want 
included on the final recording.26 Betamax’s fast-forward capability 
allowed a viewer to skip a segment he or she did not want to watch, 
although the practice was subject to some guessing on the part of the 
viewer.27 Finally, the Betamax VTR could record video camera signals, 
 
 
 19. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 435. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. All three components were necessary for the process to work. Id. The tuner received radio 
frequency signals broadcast over the public airwaves and converted them from RF to video and audio 
signals. Id. The signals were then recorded on the magnetic tape of the videotape recorder. Id. In order 
to play the recording back on a regular television, the RF adapter was needed to change the audio and 
video signals back to RF signals. Id.  
 22. Id. As early as 1965, Sony manufactured and sold videotape recorders, with and without 
built-in RF adapters and tuners. Id. In addition, Sony and other manufacturers sold all three 
components separately, allowing persons simply to purchase all three components and build their own 
VTR. Id.  
 23. Id. Because the tuner and RF adapter were not dependent on the television set, it could record 
programs on one channel while the television was airing another, or while the television was off. Id.  
 24. Id. The timer made the practice of time-shifting easier. John Cirace, When Does Complete 
Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An 
Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 647, 
668 (1984).  
 25. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 435. 
 26. Id. Of course, the viewer would have to be present and actively viewing in order to determine 
when to use and stop using the pause feature. Id.  
 27. Id. at 435-36. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/4
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giving people the capability to watch home videos made using personal 
video cameras.28 
B. The Betamax Case 
1. The District Court’s Ruling 
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,29 Universal 
Studios and Walt Disney Productions sued Sony in federal district court,30 
seeking injunctive and other relief for copyright infringement.31 Universal 
alleged that because individuals were using Betamax VTRs to record 
copyrighted works,32 Sony’s manufacture of the devices constituted 
contributory copyright infringement33 under the Copyright Act of 1976.34 
Among the studios’ greatest concerns were the consequences of time-
shifting, a practice by which viewers record a program to view it at a later 
time, and subsequently erase it.35 The studios predicted that VTR owners 
 
 
 28. Id. at 436. See also Cirace, supra note 24, at 668. This use clearly did not constitute a 
copyright infringement. Id.  
 29. Id. at 429.  
 30. The district court’s jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows federal courts 
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (2000). The studios alleged a violation of the Copyright Act of 1976. Universal City Studios, 
480 F. Supp. at 432; See also infra note 34.  
 31. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 432. In addition to suing Sony for its manufacture of 
VTRs, the studios also sued several retail stores, an advertising agency, and an individual. Id. The 
retail stores were sued on the theory that they made several copies while demonstrating VTRs to 
customers. Id. at 432. The advertising agency promoted the Betamax product by encouraging buyers to 
“record favorite shows” and “build a library” without warning that recording copyrighted shows was 
copyright infringement. Id. at 436.  
 32. One of these individuals, William Griffiths, was also a named party in the studios’ suit. Id. at 
432.  
 33. Id. at 441-42. The studios alleged that Sony was vicariously liable not only for the 
manufacture of the Betamax VTRs, but also for the distribution, advertisement, and sale of the devices. 
Id.  
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (“Section 106”). The relevant portion of the statute states: “Subject to 
sections 107 through 121, the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . ” Id. at § 106(1). 
The federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction was premised on the Copyright Act of 1976. See supra 
note 30. The Copyright Act of 1976 replaced the Copyright Act of 1909, referred to as the “New Act” 
and the “Old Act” respectively by the Supreme Court in Betamax. Universal City Studios, 480 F. 
Supp. at 442. According to the court, the case would have been resolved in favor of Sony regardless of 
whether the Old or New Act was applied because home-use copying is fair use under both acts. Id. See 
also infra notes 42, 45 & 79 and accompanying text for further discussion of fair use.  
 35. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 466. The studios foresaw four specific negative 
consequences of time-shifting: 
(1) a decrease in the size of a live audience at the time of telecast; (2) a loss to live television 
or other [studio]-sponsored entertainment at the time of viewing the copy; (3) a loss to the 
rerun audience; and (4) a loss to theater or film exhibition of the same program. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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would use either the pause feature to delete the commercials during 
recording or the fast-forward feature to pass commercials during their 
viewing of the taped material.36 This alteration of viewer behavior, the 
studios feared, would cause advertisers to pay less for advertising space.37 
The studios predicted that the greatest harm would result from home-use 
recording,38 and accordingly asked the court to enjoin Sony from further 
copyright infringement.39 
Analyzing the legislative intent of the Copyright Act of 1976,40 with a 
focus on home-use recording,41 the court found that home-use recording 
 
 
Id. The court responded to each of the studio’s arguments by declaring: (1) Nielsen Ratings had 
developed technology to measure when a VTR was recording a program, thus allowing VTR owners 
to be measured as part of the live audience; (2) the plaintiffs provided no evidence to support the 
assumption that VTR owners view recordings when they would otherwise be watching live television 
or going to a theater, resulting in time-shifting rearranging, not replacing, hours viewers would be 
watching television; (3) the plaintiffs offered no evidence to show that the only viewers who watched 
reruns were people who had never before seen the program, and in fact, marketing practices at the time 
showed that copyright holders were able to command high rates for rights to reruns; and (4) the 
expense of maintaining a library plus the advantages of purchasing and/or renting prerecorded 
recordings outweighed the benefits to librarying movies on television, specifically because 
prerecorded videos were not edited for television and contained no commercials. Id. at 466-67. 
 36. Id. at 468. See infra note 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s 
response to the studios’ arguments.  
 37. Id. 
 38. See Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 465. The court defined “home-use recording” as 
“the operation of the [recording device] in a private home to record a program for subsequent home 
viewing.” Id. at 442. The court specifically examined four examples of home-use recording: (1) 
recording programs off-air but never viewing the copies; (2) time-shifting, recording programs off-air, 
viewing, and later erasing the copy; (3) librarying, or recording programs and saving the copy for 
multiple viewings; and (4) avoiding commercials either by using the pause feature during recording or 
by fast-forwarding during playback. Id. at 465.  
 39. Id. at 443.  
 40. Id. at 443-46. Legislative history clearly showed that the Copyright Act of 1976 was not 
intended to prohibit recording for private home use. See H. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7 (1971), reprinted in 
1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572. For example, a House Report regarding the New Act stated: 
[I]t is not the intention of the Committee to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or 
from tapes or records, of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use 
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it. This 
practice is common and unrestrained today, and the record producers and performers would 
be in no different position from that of owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions 
over the past 20 years.  
Id. In addition, concerns about the enforceability of prohibiting home-use recording surfaced in later 
House Subcommittee hearings, in which the Assistant Register of Copyrights stated that she did “not 
see anybody going into anyone’s home and preventing [home-use recording], or forcing legislation 
that would engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping,” although she conceded the 
problem of “unauthorized video recordings finding their way into the market.” Prohibiting Piracy of 
Sound Recordings Hearing Before the Subcomm. No. 3 on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 22-23 (1971) 
(statement of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights).  
 41. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 442. The court first considered the issue of home-use 
recording because the plaintiffs alleged that it was the source of the greatest harm. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/4
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constituted fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (“Section 107”),42 and therefore was not copyright 
infringement.43 Although technically forbidden by copyright law, a fair use 
(e.g., reproduction of copyrighted works for news reporting, teaching, or 
research) is not considered copyright infringement.44 The applicability of 
fair use has been analyzed using four factor: harm, the nature of the 
material, purpose of use, and substantiality.45 The district court analyzed 
each factor,46 and found that although “Betamax and other technological 
advances [would] undoubtedly change the industry and introduce new 
considerations into plaintiff’s marketing considerations,”47 the harm 
 
 
 42. Id. at 446. Courts have described “fair use” as creating “a privilege in others than the owner 
of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent, 
notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner.” Id. (quoting Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random 
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) quoting BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERACY PROPERTY 
260 (1966)). The Supreme Court has defined “fair use” as a privilege “to use the copyrighted material 
in a reasonable manner without [the copyright owner’s] consent.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property 
260 (1944)). “[C]ertain unauthorized but ‘fair’ uses of copyrighted material do not constitute copyright 
infringement.” See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal 
citations omitted). Ultimately, the doctrine of fair use was codified by Congress in the Copyright Act 
of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). For the text of § 107, see infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 43. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 456. 
 44. Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 4, at 455. See infra note 45 and accompanying text for factors 
considered in determining what constitutes a fair use. 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute states, in relevant part: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. One concern regarding the statute is that the list of factors is neither exclusive nor required, and 
offers no guidance as to the relative weight of each factor. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A), at 13-151 to –154 (2003).  
 46. See generally Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 452-55. See infra note 52 and 
accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of the court’s substantiality analysis. Other courts have 
performed similarly detailed analyses of the four factors listed in section 107. See, e.g., Basic Books, 
Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-35 (S.D.N.Y 1991); Harper & Row 
Publishers, 471 U.S. at 560-69. See generally Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics 
Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143 
(1993) for an in-depth analysis of the Kinko’s decision. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 578-94 (1994) (considering the four factors of Section 107 in holding that commercial 
character of song parody did not create presumption against fair use).  
 47. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 452. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suffered by the studios was not outcome-determinative.48 Specifically to 
the nature of the recorded material, the court reasoned that characterization 
of television as “entertainment” rather than “scientific” or “educational” 
did not automatically constitute copyright infringement through 
unauthorized recording.49 Moreover, the court acknowledged a significant 
difference between copyright holders who receive payment directly from 
users and television studios and broadcasters who are paid according to 
advertising revenue.50 In addition, the court supported the facilitation of 
disseminating public information as a legitimate purpose for non-
commercial home-use recording of television programs.51 Finally, 
although home-use recording usually involves recording an entire 
program, the substantiality of the recording, when balanced with the other 
three factors, did not convince the court that home-use recording 
constituted copyright infringement.52 The district court concluded, inter 
 
 
 48. Id. See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (1973), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding that photocopying of medical journals by a medical 
research organization did not constitute copyright infringement, because the plaintiff “failed to prove 
its assumption of economic detriment, in the past or potentially for the future”).  
 49. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 452-53.  
 50. Id. at 453. The district court found that copyright owners in the television industry are 
distinct from other copyright holders who receive payment directly from their viewers or readers, 
stating:  
[H]olders of copyrights for television programs are not paid directly by those who ultimately 
enjoy the publication of the material—that is, the television viewers—but by advertisers who 
use the drawing power of the copyrighted material to promote their goods and services. Such 
advertisers typically pay the broadcasters a fee for each transmission of an advertisement 
based on an estimate of the expected number and characteristics of the viewers who will 
watch the program. While, as members of the general public, the viewers indirectly pay for 
the privilege of viewing copyrighted material through increased prices for the goods and 
services of the advertisers, they are not involved in a direct economic relationship with the 
copyright holders or their licensees.  
Id. at 453 (quoting Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 411-12 (1974)). 
The district court similarly considered the studios’ fears that the VTR’s pause and fast-forward 
features would alter viewer behavior, decreasing advertisers’ willingness to pay for advertising. 
Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 468. The district court, however, noted that in order to delete 
the commercials while recording, viewers have to watch them. Id. In addition, using the fast-forward 
feature to skip commercials while viewing may prove to be too tedious a task for most recordings. Id. 
The court found that ninety-two percent of recorded programs were recorded with commercials and 
only twenty-five percent of VTR owners fast-forwarded through them. Id.  
 51. Id. at 452-54. The district court looked at the purpose of recordings, asking whether the 
material is “used for criticism, research or other independent work.” Id. at 453. The court determined 
the purpose of home-use was to increase viewer access to broadcasted materials, which was 
“consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information 
through the public airwaves.” Id. at 454 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). Again, the court noted the infeasibility of enforcing a prohibition of 
home-use recording. Id. 
 52. Id. at 454. In general, the fair use defense is more likely to be available the less substantial 
the taking from the copyrighted work. Id. The court found that although home-use recording usually 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/4
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alia, that both VTR owners and copyright holders derive benefits from the 
time-shifting ability of the device.53 So finding, the district court entered 
judgment for Sony.54 
2. The Court of Appeal’s Ruling 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court’s judgment and held Sony liable for contributory copyright 
infringement.55 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the fair use 
doctrine did not sanction home-use recording with VTRs.56 The court 
engaged in an analysis similar to that of the district court of the four 
factors listed in section 107.57 Ultimately, the judges decided that 
manufacture of VTR devices did not constitute fair use regarding each 
factor.58 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court relied on 
 
 
involved recording the entire work, the fair use defense was not necessarily defeated, depending on the 
balance between all four factors. Id.  
 53. Id. at 467. Use of VTRs to time-shift results in a benefit to the studios, broadcasters, and 
advertisers, in that the VTR allows for more people to view broadcasts. Id. But see Midge M. Hyman, 
The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 105, 130 (1985) (arguing that although a VTR “presents a smorgasbord of options to the viewer, it 
is poison to the copyright owner whose work is continuously being exploited without compensation 
for the copying of his creation”).  
 54. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 456. Finding that home-use recording did not 
constitute copyright infringement, the district court concluded that even if infringement did occur, 
plaintiffs offered “no concrete evidence to suggest that the Betamax will change the studios’ financial 
picture.” Id. at 469. 
 55. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 977 (9th Cir. 1981) 
[hereinafter Universal II].  
 56. Id. at 971. Compare Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (1973) (finding that 
medical science would suffer serious harm if copying medical and scientific journals constituted 
copyright infringement) with Universal II, 659 F.2d at 971 (stating that no comparable harm to society 
existed in prohibiting home-use videorecording).  
 57. Universal II, 659 F.2d at 972-74. See supra note 45 and text accompanying for a description 
of the four factors of section 107. 
 58. Id. at 972-74. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the relevant text of section 107.  
 The court of appeals disagreed with the district court’s analysis of harm to the studios. Id. at 973. 
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The court of appeals determined that the district court was 
both overly strict in its requirement of the studios’ showing of actual harm and not sympathetic to the 
difficulty of proving harm from infringement. Universal II, 659 F.2d at 974. The circuit court’s 
analysis of the second factor—the nature of the protected works—served as an inquiry of whether 
increased access to the works “would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of 
information.” Id. at 972 (quoting Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 
(2d Civ. 1966)). See also supra notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text. The court stated that the 
defense of fair use is less likely to be available to those copying entertainment. Universal II, 659 F.2d 
at 972.  
 Analyzing the purpose of the home-use recordings, the court noted that the recording of 
entertainment programs for convenience did not fall within the non-profit educational use protected by 
section 107, emphasizing that “[t]he fact that the ‘infringing’ activity takes places in the homes does 
not warrant a blanket exemption from any liability.” Id. (emphasis in originals). See also supra note 51 
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“distortions” in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S.59 to justify its application 
of the fair use doctrine.60 The Williams & Wilkins Court treated copies 
made for intrinsic or “ordinary” purposes as falling within the scope of fair 
use.61 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that fair use should deal only 
with cases in which a “second author” uses the work of a “first author,” 
not cases that involved merely ordinary use.62 The court posited that 
ordinary use, such as photocopying and videorecording, should not fall 
within common law fair use, but instead should be specifically exempted 
by Congress.63 Disagreeing completely with the district court, the Ninth 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for the determination of the 
appropriate relief.64 In so doing, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested that 
a compulsory license, or continuing royalties, may be an appropriate 
remedy if great public injury would result from an injunction.65 Although 
 
 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s analysis of the same factor.  
 Finally, the court of appeals focused on the substantiality of the recording. Universal II, 659 F.2d 
at 973. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text. The court stated that appropriation of the 
property interest of a copyright holder without his consent is impermissible, relying on its own opinion 
in a prior case: “While other factors in the fair use calculus may not be sufficient by themselves to 
preclude the fair use defense, this and other courts have accepted the traditional American rule that 
excessive copying precludes fair use.” Universal II, 659 F.2d at 973 (quoting Walt Disney Productions 
v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978)).  
 59. 487 F.2d at 1359. The Ninth Circuit described Williams & Wilkins Co. as “appropriately 
regarded as the ‘Dred Scott decision of copyright law.’” Universal II, 659 F.2d at 970 (internal 
citations omitted). See infra note 60 and accompanying text for a description of the “distortions” listed 
by the Ninth Circuit. 
 60. Id. at 970. The court considered that the district court’s application of the doctrine 
“stretche[d] fair use beyond recognition and undermine[d] our traditional reliance on the economic 
incentives provided to authors by the copyright scheme.” Id. The “distortions” to which the court of 
appeals pointed included the district court’s extension of the doctrine to apply to “ordinary use.” 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: a Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1652 (1982).  
 61. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1350-53. 
 62. Universal II, 659 F.2d at 970 (quoting LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN 
COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 24 (1978)).  
 63. Id. at 971. See also Gordon, supra note 60, at 1652. 
 64. Universal II, 659 F.2d at 976. The court of appeals gave the district court latitude in deciding 
whether statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) were appropriate, but urged the district court to 
reconsider permanent injunctive relief against the infringers, and also suggested that a continuing 
royalty (a compulsory license) may be appropriate. Id. See infra note 65 for cases after Universal II 
was overturned in which the Ninth Circuit has continued to treat continuing royalties as an appropriate 
remedy. 
 65. Universal II, 659 F.2d at 976. When great public injury could result from a complete 
injunction, the Ninth Circuit opined that a continuing royalty “very well may be an acceptable 
resolution in this context.” Id.  
 When determining the appropriate remedy for copyright infringement, the Ninth Circuit 
consistently looks to whether a complete injunction will result in great public injury. See, e.g., A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that compulsory 
licensing was not appropriate because no great public injury would result from a complete injunction 
from distribution of copyrighted works); Abend v. MCA, Inc. 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) 
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the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was eventually overturned,66 the Supreme Court 
stopped at the issue of liability, and therefore did not approach the issue of 
appropriate remedy.67 As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s determination that 
continuing royalties may be an appropriate remedy for copyright 
infringement under certain circumstances is still good law.68  
3. The Supreme Court 
a. The Majority 
In 1984, Sony appealed to the United States Supreme Court in Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.69 In reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, the Court emphasized that the primary use of VTRs is 
time-shifting, by which viewers record a program to view it at a later time, 
before finally erasing it.70 The Court noted that the studios offered no 
evidence to show that Betamax owners had decreased their television 
viewing.71 On the contrary, evidence showed that the practice of time-
shifting actually enlarged the viewing audience.72 The Supreme Court 
considered the issue of whether the VTR was capable of “commercially 
 
 
(holding that a complete injunction preventing the re-release of a film to theaters against the wishes of 
the copyright holder of the original story, and thus depriving society of the chance to see the film, 
would result in great injustice). 
 66. Betamax, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).  
 67. Id.  
 68. After Universal II, in response the Supreme Court’s Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151 (1975), Congress proposed the Home Recording Act of 1983. Hyman, supra note 53, at 
132. Under the Home Recording Act, individuals recording a copyrighted work for private use would 
be exempt from liability. Id. In exchange for the fair use exception, manufacturers of blank tapes and 
VTRs would be required to pay a royalty to the copyright owners. Id. Various problems, such as the 
difficulty of setting accurate royalty rates that reflected the VTR market, kept the legislation from 
passing, but a colorable argument still exists that a compulsory licensing scheme would reduce 
transaction costs such as identification, information, and time costs. Id. at 132, 134-35. In addition, 
private negotiations between copyright holders and users would be encouraged because the licensing 
scheme would balance the comparative bargaining powers of each party. Id. at 133-35. 
 69. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 423.  
 70. Id. at 423. Generally, time-shifting is practiced by viewers unable to watch programs when 
they are shown because they are not at home, are otherwise occupied, or are watching another program 
at the same time. Id.  
 71. Id. at 424. 
 72. Id. at 421. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUDIES 325, 331 (1989) (proposing that authors may derive substantially more 
benefits from publication than from mere royalties).  
 A parallel situation in which the copyright holder derives benefits from what would otherwise be 
termed “copyright infringement” is found in book reviews. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 
F.3d 512, 518-19 (7th Cir. 2002). See infra note 139 and accompanying text for a further explanation 
of how consumer demand for copyrighted books is actually increased by the publication of book 
reviews.  
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significant non-infringing uses,”73 a category in which time-shifting is 
included.74 Focusing on time-shifting and the fair use doctrine, the Court 
found that the studios did not prove that the use of VTRs to record 
copyrighted programs impaired the commercial value of the copyrights or 
created any likelihood of future harm.75 Among the permitted uses of the 
VTR considered by the Court were both authorized76 and unauthorized77 
time-shifting for private use in homes.78 Like both the district court and 
the Ninth Circuit, the Court considered the harm, the nature of the 
material, purpose of use, and substantiality.79 The Court ultimately 
determined that the prohibition of non-infringing uses would result in a 
restriction of access to public ideas without any comparable benefit.80 
Accordingly, the Court held that Sony’s marketing of the Betamax was not 
 
 
 73. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 442.  
 74. Id. In so concluding, the Court declined to explore whether each possible VTR use 
constituted infringement, instead focusing only on whether a “significant number of them would be 
non-infringing.” Id. In fact, the Court declined to discuss quantitatively the precise amount of use that 
is commercially significant. Id. Most significant to the Court was the fact that even unauthorized 
private, non-commercial home-use time-shifting was non-infringing. Id.  
 75. Id. at 421, 456.  
 76. See generally id. at 443-47. Evidence presented regarding authorized uses included programs 
that could be recorded without objection from the copyright holder, such as sports events or religious 
and educational programs. Id. at 424, 444. Representatives from professional baseball, basketball, 
football and hockey testified before the Court that they did not object to home-use recording of 
televised games. Id. at 444. 
 77. See generally id. at 447-55. “Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not 
necessarily infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts 
with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statute.” Id. at 447 (citing 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1975)). In order to determine whether 
the copying in the Betamax case constituted infringement, the Court analyzed the four factors of 
Section 107. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 448-51.  
 78. Id. at 442. Nevertheless, the Court found that home-use recording for purposes of time-
shifting, but not librarying, constituted fair use. See id. at 449. See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS 
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 135 (3d ed. 2000).  
 79. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 448-51. Focusing most intently on harm to the copyright holder, the 
Court recognized that, although the purpose of copyright protection is to encourage creative efforts, an 
unauthorized use that results in no harm to the copyright holder does not need to be prohibited in order 
to encourage such efforts. Id. at 450. 
 The Supreme Court also referred to the district court’s determination that home-use recording was 
in accordance with the First Amendment policy of full dissemination of public information in its 
opinions. Id. at 425-26. This decision has been seen as representative of the tension between the first 
amendment and copyright law. See Richard K. Berger, Comment, Betamax Meets the Supreme Court: 
A Judicial Disappointment, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 285, 307-08 (1985) (predicting that “[b]alancing 
copyright against the first amendment will produce an erosion of copyright itself”). Berger further 
argues that although copyright protection gives authors incentives to create, the first amendment will 
“snatch away” the benefit by denying authors the right to control his or her own work, making 
copyright “nothing more than a broken promise.” Id. at 308-09. See id. at 307-08 n.224 for cases in 
which courts have attempted to square the first amendment with copyright protection.  
 80. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 450-51. 
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contributory copyright infringement, and reversed the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit.81  
b. The Dissent 
Four justices, however, disagreed with the majority.82 First, the dissent, 
unlike both the district court and the majority, found no implied exemption 
in the Copyright Act of 1976 for home-use recordings.83 Based on this 
finding,84 the dissent analyzed the issue in the context of the fair use 
doctrine.85 Defending the application of the doctrine in specific 
circumstances,86 Justice Blackmun explained the difference between the 
“scholar,” or productive user, and the “ordinary user.”87 For example, the 
dissent considered the two risks of the copyright system: reducing authors’ 
incentives to create by depriving them of their monopolies, and reducing 
other authors’ incentives to create by granting one author a complete 
monopoly.88 These considerations led to the conclusion that home-use 
 
 
 81. Id. at 456.  
 82. Id. at 457-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun penned the dissenting opinion, in 
which Justices Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 457.  
 83. Id. at 475. Blackmun first examined section 106 to determine whether Sony’s actions 
constituted violation of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 468-69, 474. 
 84. Id. at 475. Justice Blackmun recognized that the legislative history considered by the district 
court was in fact history of the 1971 Amendment to the “Old Act,” the Copyright Act of 1909, which 
in fact specifically addressed the problem of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Id. at 470. Unlike 
House committee reports on the 1971 amendment to the Old Act, reports on the 1976 act contained no 
exception for home-use recording. See generally id. at 470-74.  
 85. Id. at 475.  
 86. Id. at 477-79. Blackmun provided one example where strict copyright enforcement would 
inhibit creative progress: “the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to refer to 
and to quote the work of prior scholars.” Id. at 477.  
 87. Id. 
Where the ordinary user decides that the owner’s price is too high, and forgoes use of the 
work, only the individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not 
only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to knowledge. 
The scholar’s work, in other words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits. 
In such a case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy—albeit at the first author’s 
expense—to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author’s work for the 
public good. 
Id. at 477-78. See also Gordon, supra note 60, at 1630-32 for further discussion of the effect of 
externalities on the market for new technology. See also infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text 
discussing market externalities. 
 88. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 479. Blackmun pointed to the words of Lord Mansfield in Sayre v. 
Moore: 
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of 
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived 
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may 
not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded. 
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videorecording was an ordinary, rather than a productive, use of the 
copyrighted programs because no public benefit justified limiting the 
rights given to copyright holders under section 106.89 Finally, Blackmun 
analyzed time-shifting in the context of the four factors of the statute 
discussed by each lower court.90 With respect to harm, Blackmun argued 
that the majority failed to consider the effect of time-shifting on the new 
post-VTR market.91 The new market consisting of persons purchasing 
VTRs to time-shift produced a benefit that should have been conferred on 
the studios, but instead was going to Sony.92 According to Blackmun, the 
studios could prove harm by showing that copyright value would increase 
if they were compensated for each copy used to time-shift.93 Accordingly, 
the dissent concluded that time-shifting was not fair use under section 
107.94  
As to the appropriate remedy, the dissent concurred with the Ninth 
Circuit’s determination that “continuing royalties” would be an 
appropriate means of balancing equities.95 Furthermore, Blackmun stated 
that other nations imposed compensatory royalties on manufacturers of 
devices used to infringe copyrights.96 Finally, Blackmun implied that the 
majority was not staying true to traditional copyright principles, and 
suggested that Court might be attempting to “avoid difficult problems by 
refusing to apply the law.”97  
 
 
Id. at 479-80 n.33 (quoting Sayre v. Moore as set forth in Cary v. Longman, 1 East 361 n.(b), 102 Eng. 
Rep. 139, 140 n.(b) (K.B. 1785)). The common law fair use doctrine developed as a result of the 
courts’ conflict in balancing the two extremes. Vincent F. Aiello, Note, Educating Sony: Requiem for 
a “Fair Use”, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 159, 159 (1985).  
 89. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 480. Blackmun did, however, recognize the application of the fair use 
doctrine in truly de minimis cases, for example, photocopying a newspaper clipping to send to another, 
or pinning a quotation on a bulletin board. Id. at 481-82. In such cases, although the unproductive use 
provided no public benefit, neither did limiting the use. Id.  
 90. Id. at 496-99. 
 91. Id. at 497-98. According to Blackmun, the majority mistakenly focused on the effect of time-
shifting in the present market. Id. Indeed, the market that should have been considered included 
persons who purchased VTRs specifically to time-shift. Id. at 498. 
 In addition to harm, Blackmun discussed the other three factors of section 107: purpose of use, 
nature of the copyrighted work, and substantiality of the portion. Id. at 496-97.  
 92. Id. at 498. Sony received the benefit through Betamax sales. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 499. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 499 n.51 (citing Austria and Germany as examples of European countries that impose 
royalties as penalties for copyright infringement).  
 97. Id. at 500. Blackmun stated there “‘can be no really satisfactory solution to the problem 
presented here, until Congress acts’” to amend the copyright laws to apply to situations such as the one 
faced in Betamax. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 167 (1976) 
(Burger, Chief J., dissenting)).  
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C. PVR Technology (TiVo, ReplayTV) Compared with VTR Technology 
Like the VTR, the personal video recorder (PVR),98 such as TiVo or 
ReplayTV, can also be used for time-shifting.99 PVRs, however, 
drastically differ from VTRs in certain critical respects. Differences 
include the use of digital hard drives (computer memory) instead of 
videotape,100 the ease of such use,101 the ability to connect to the 
internet,102 ability to skip commercials,103 and an unprecedented control 
over real-time television.104 The biggest concerns to advertisers is the PVR 
viewers’ ability to skip commercials.105 ReplayTV provides owners with 
two methods to omit commercials: “Commercial Advance” and “Quick 
Skip.”106 “Quick Skip” can be used to jump manually over unwanted 
commercials in thirty second increments.107 In contrast, “Commercial 
Advance” allows owners to skip commercials completely during 
playback.108 As a result of the increasing ease of this new technology, one 
in five people who own a PVR say they never watch any commercials.109 
This statistic shows a significant change from the ninety-six percent of 
 
 
 98. James Poniewozik, Here Come PVRs: Is Network Doomed?, TIME, Sept. 27, 1999, at 62. 
PVRs can also be called “digital video recorders” (DVRs) or “personal TV.” Id.  
 99. Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRs: 
Introducing TiVo to Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 422-23 (2002).  
 100. Id. at 422. 
 101. See id.  
 102. Sonic Blue: ReplayTV 4500 Features, available at http://www.sonicblue.com/video/replaytv/ 
replaytv_4000_features.asp. [hereinafter “Repay TV 4500 Features”] With this built-in Internet 
technology, one ReplayTV owner can send and receive recorded programs to another. Id. In addition, a 
ReplayTV owner with more than one device in the household can record a program on one PVR, while 
watching it on any other PVR in the house. Id. See also Laurie J. Flynn, supra note 14, at C4. 
 103. Bower, supra note 99, at 423. Viewers’ ability to omit commercials has led to warnings that 
PVRs such as TiVo and ReplayTV are the “Trojan horse that will end network television and TV 
advertising, and even mass culture itself.” Rob Walker, Who’s Afraid of TiVo? The Myth of 
Destructive Extrapolation, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2000, at 396.  
 104. Bower, supra note 99, at 422-23. PVR owners watching live television can pause the 
program they are watching, leave the room, and return to where they left off, at their convenience. Id. 
In addition, owners are able to create their own instant replays because the PVR is constantly 
recording. Id. “The sports fan is no longer at the mercy of some network executive who prefers to 
show a replay of Minnesota receiver Randy Moss’s touchdown after the commercial break.” Id. (citing 
Michael Lewis, Boom Box, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 6).  
 105. Bower, supra note 99, at 423.  
 106. ReplayTV 4500 Features, supra note 102,  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. Although actual results vary by quality of television reception and nature of the program, 
studies showed that approximately ninety-six percent of commercials were eliminated. Id.  
 109. Harmon, supra note 12, at A1. 
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Betamax users who recorded commercials even though the device had the 
capability to pause and fast-forward through them.110  
While the cost of ReplayTV ranges from $300 and $1000 per unit,111 a 
TiVo unit only costs between $199 and $299 for the unit.112 Aside from 
the TiVo unit, however, users must pay either a $12.95 monthly or a $249 
lifetime fee.113 The monthly fee charged by TiVo provides for services 
including the “Season Pass,” which automatically finds and records every 
episode of a specified television show all season long, even taking into 
account schedule changes;114 the “Wish List,” which finds and records 
programs featuring the viewer’s favorite actor, director, team, or topic;115 
“Smart Recording,” which, based on viewer preferences and program 
history, suggests other programs to record;116 and “Showcases,” original 
TiVo entertainment.117 
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. Basic Economic Principles Underlying Intellectual Property Protection 
Copyright law is predicated on economic principles.118 Economic 
theory can therefore be used to explain certain phenomena that occur in 
the intellectual property context. For example, innovation is information, a 
“public goods” problem arises with these products (PVRs) as television 
programs are costly to produce but are easy to copy.119 A public good can 
 
 
 110. Id. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for the district court findings in Universal City 
Studios findings of the percentage of people who watched commercials in 1979.  
 111. ReplayTV 4500 Features, supra note 102.  
 112. Buy TiVo, available at http://www.tivo.com/2.0.asp. [hereinafter “Buy TiVo”]. Id. 
 113. See also Christine Y. Chen, TiVo is Smart TV (But Brains Aren’t Everything), FORTUNE, 
Mar. 19, 2001, at 124, 128 (stating that evidence exists that electronic devices do not usually gain mass 
appeal until their cost is less than $300). Chen suggested that TiVo would have to lower its price 
drastically (then $399) before it could gain mass appeal. Id. Certain TiVo models now fall under the 
$300 line. Buy TiVo, supra. 
 114. TiVo Service, supra note 113. 
 115. Id. Similarly, PVRs have a built-in channel guide, allowing the user to record a show without 
even knowing when and on what channel it is being shown. Lev Grossman, Play it Again, Lev, TIME, 
Nov. 20, 2000, at 160.  
 116. TiVo Service, supra note 113. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Berger, supra note 79, at 285. Proof of copyright’s economic basis is found in the Betamax 
holding, in which the majority stated that “[c]opyright ‘is intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .’” Id. at 285 n.4 (quoting Betamax, 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (emphasis added)). Copyright law is based on the American system of economic-
based rights, as opposed to the European system of moral rights. Id.  
 119. Dam, supra note 5, at 114. Expressive works contain information, the “quintessential public 
good.” Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1466-67. As with all public goods, the original 
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be defined by two characteristics: non-rivalry in consumption and non-
excludability of benefits.120 The public goods problem begins when 
copiers are able to copy works without incurring the initial costs of 
producing them.121 Unauthorized production of the information drives 
down the market price to equal the cost of copying.122 The cost of 
producing the work generally consists of the author’s time and effort, in 
addition to the publisher’s costs of solicitation, editing, and typesetting.123 
Usually, these publisher’s costs are referred to as the “cost of 
expression.”124 Allowing works to be copied at little or no cost results in 
competition.125 As a result, the author is neither able to receive the benefits 
of his or her labor nor recoup his or her costs in producing the work.126 
The author is also discouraged from future innovations for fear of lost 
profits.127  
On the other hand, the practice of pricing copies at the author’s 
marginal cost of expression may discourage others from copying.128 Such 
a situation ultimately discourages authors from creating works because 
 
 
cost of producing the work is high, while the cost of reproducing the work is low. Landes & Posner, 
supra note 72, at 326. See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation 
of the public goods problem.  
 120. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1467 n.42 (citing RICHARD CORNES & TODD 
SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986)). Non-
rivalry is present when consumption by one person does not diminish consumption opportunities 
available to another. Id. Non-excludability of benefits of a good is present when people who have not 
paid for the good cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits.Id.; See also infra note 148 and 
accompanying text.  
 121. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1467.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 326-27. 
 124. Id. Landes and Posner explained the economics behind the decision to create new works:  
For a new work to be created, the expected return—typically, and we shall assume 
exclusively, from the sale of copies—must exceed the expected cost. [Assuming a negatively 
sloped demand curve, t]he creator will make copies up to the point where the marginal cost of 
one more copy equals its expected marginal revenue. The resulting difference between price 
and marginal cost, summed over the number of copies sold, will generate revenues to offset 
the cost of expression. Since the decision to create the work must be made before the demand 
for copies is known, the work will be created only if the difference between expected 
revenues and the cost of making copies equals or exceeds the cost of expression. If we 
assume that the cost of creating (equivalent) works differs among authors, the number of 
works created will increase until the returns from the last work created just covers the 
(increasing) cost of expression. 
Id. at 327-28. 
 125. Dam, supra note 5, at 114. 
 126. Id. at 114-15.  
 127. Id. at 115. Motives other than profit such as prestige, other non-monetary returns, and 
monetary returns from being first to market may drive an author to create works. Id. Loss of these 
“gains” may also discourage an author from producing works. Id.  
 128. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 326. 
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total revenues do not sufficiently cover costs.129 The non-excludable 
nature of public information therefore implies such works will be under-
produced by the market.130 Copyright protection attempts to strike a 
balance between providing authors with the incentives to create, and 
allowing dissemination of works.131 Efficiency in this balance is achieved 
by maximizing the difference between the benefits from the creation of 
new works, the sum of the losses from limited access, and the costs of 
administering the protective measures.132  
In addition, society benefits when innovation occurs over time, rather 
than all at once.133 This principle thus necessitates that intellectual 
property protection not be too strict because access to past work is very 
important in the development of new innovation.134 
B. The Economics of Fair Use 
As explained above, the fair use doctrine allows certain unauthorized 
copying of a copyrighted work without deeming the copier an infringer.135 
The doctrine is especially important in the high transaction costs case, 
where the costs of voluntary exchange are so high that they prohibit an 
otherwise efficient exchange.136 Transaction costs are typically described 
as the “cost of exchange.”137 High-transaction cost cases, in which the 
 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1467 n.42. See also supra notes 121-30 and 
accompanying text for further analysis of underproduction of public goods.  
 131. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 326. Similar problems surface, however, even if 
copyright protection is put into place. Gordon, supra note 60, at 1629. If transaction costs between the 
holder of the copyright and the intended copier become prohibitive, a socially useful transfer of right 
may not occur if the copyright is enforced. Id. Enforcement of the copyright holder’s right thus 
eliminates use of the work. Id. The result is a lose-lose situation: the copyright holder receives no 
income for disseminating his or her work, and society is deprived of the benefit of the work. Id.  
 132. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 326. 
 133. Dam, supra note 5, at 115. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 136. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 357. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text for a 
discussion on the effect of prohibitively high transaction costs. 
 137. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 78, at 87. For example, user A might be willing to pay 
copyright holder B a sum that B would be willing to accept to allow A’s use, but negotiation is 
prohibitive. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 357. 
 Transaction costs are divided into three categories: search costs, finding someone to buy what you 
are selling or sell what you are buying; bargaining costs, negotiation and drafting of an agreement; and 
enforcement costs, monitoring performance and punishing violations of the agreement. COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 78, at 87-88. Several factors determine whether transaction costs will be high or low, 
including: the uniqueness of the good, public versus private information in negotiations, clarity of each 
party’s rights, number of parties, anticipation of contingencies, and unreasonable hostility. Id. at 88-89. 
See also MACKAAY, supra note 9, at 52 (listing geographical dispersion as an additional factor in 
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benefits of the use exceed the costs of production, should be decided in 
accordance with the fair use doctrine.138 Additional examples of fair uses 
include book reviews139 and parodies.140 Fair use issues also arise when 
courts are left to decide whether a work is either infringing on or is merely 
“substantially similar” to an already-copyrighted work.141 In so doing, the 
courts are actually deciding that the work is either a “productive” or a 
“reproductive” use.142 In general, the fair use defense is more likely to be 
available for a productive use than for a reproductive use.143  
 
 
determining transaction costs).  
 138. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 358. In some high-transaction-cost cases, the “costs of 
enforcement against a diffuse group of individuals may outweigh anticipated receipts.” Gordon, supra 
note 60, at 1629. In such cases, some value-maximizing transactions do not occur if the copyright is 
enforced, because users will simply stop using the work, the owner will derive no income from it, and 
society will lose the benefit of dissemination of new information. Id. See infra note 153 and 
accompanying text. The notion that high-transaction-cost cases should be afforded the fair use 
privilege is subject to three important qualifications, which bolster the argument that the fair use 
doctrine should be construed narrowly. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 357-58. First, either ex post 
damages or compulsory licensing may be a better way than fair use to avoid high transaction costs, 
because they allow the copyright owner to reap the benefits of his or her creation. Id. Second, 
application of fair use as a default in high transaction cost cases might diminish incentives to develop 
market mechanisms that would reduce transaction costs, as well as make negotiations between 
copyright holders and users more feasible. Id. at 358. Finally, even if transaction costs between 
copyright owners and users are prohibitive, the work might be valuable enough that the user will 
simply buy the entire work. Id.  
 139. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 358-59. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 
517 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that book reviews “that quote from (‘copy’) the books being reviewed 
increase the demand for copyrighted works; to deem such copying infringement would therefore be 
perverse”). Allowing a copyright owner of a book to control which book reviewers were allowed to 
review the book would amount to giving him or her control over public criticism of the work. Id. The 
credibility of book reviews would drastically hurt all copyright owners, not just owners of the 
copyrights of the worst books. Id. at 517. Consumers would no longer be able to rely on book reviews 
to guide them on which books to buy. Id. Book reviews, however, are not automatically protected by 
the fair use doctrine. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (declaring that a 
book review “may or may not be fair use”). If a court determines that the reviewer stands to profit 
from the exploitation of the copyrighted work without paying the price, or intends to supplant the 
copyright holder’s right of first publication by quoting so much of the book as to serve as a substitute 
of the book, then the fair use defense will fail. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Ty, 292 F.3d at 517.  
 140. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594; Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 359-60.  
 141. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 360. An example of such a work is non-critical parody, or 
“burlesque.” Id. See also Ty, 292 F.2d at 518 (distinguishing between parody, which usually falls 
under fair use, and burlesque, which does not). A burlesque is simply a humorous, non-ridiculing 
version of the original work, and may act as a substitute for the original. Ty, 292 F.2d at 518.  
 142. Landes & Posner, supra note 72, at 360. 
 143. Id. Copyright holders are given the exclusive right to make derivative works from their 
original works, and burlesque is characterized as derivative work. Id. One method of distinguishing 
between infringing burlesque and non-infringing parody is to ask whether the work fulfills the demand 
for the original work, and if it might siphon revenues from the original. Id.  
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C. The Economics of Betamax 
1. The Incentive/Dissemination Conflict 
An individual’s financial incentive for the creation of original works 
often conflicts with the societal goals regarding the dissemination of 
knowledge.144 Both Congress and the courts have attempted to provide 
artists and authors with remuneration for use of their work.145 The authors’ 
desire for compensation, as well as the government’s desire to protect that 
compensation, conflict directly with the ultimate goal of disseminating 
knowledge throughout society.146 Information, including television 
programming, is a public good.147 Consumption of a public good by one 
does not preclude consumption by another.148 Because it is a public good, 
free riding becomes a concern.149 The marginal cost of additional 
television viewers is zero, as it costs no more for the information to be sent 
to one million television sets than to just one.150 Economists generally 
believe that to be efficient, public goods should be disseminated without 
charge in order to prevent problems associated with public goods and free 
riding.151 The conflict between incentive and dissemination occurs to its 
 
 
 144. Cirace, supra note 24, at 650. Most expressive works, including books, music, and television 
programs, build on earlier copyrighted works. POSNER, supra note 9, at 47. The greater the scope of 
the copyright laws, the higher the cost to all users of creating subsequent works built on the earlier 
work. Id. Thus, although the copyright holder reaps increased benefits in terms of expected revenues 
from the licensing of his own copyrights, his own costs of creating subsequent works also increases. 
Id. The competing interests also offer a compelling reason why copyrights should not be perpetual. 
The durational limitation on copyrights for works created after January 1, 1978 is currently the 
author’s life plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2002). If owners were given perpetual copyrights, 
the cost of creating subsequent works would increase at a higher rate, because earlier works would be 
neither in the public domain nor available for use in the creation of new works without having to 
purchase a license from the copyright holder. POSNER, supra note 9, at 47. 
 145. Cirace, supra note 24, at 650 (citing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-38 
(1966) for a historical overview of copyright legislation). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) 
for an example of the early common law approach to copyright protection. 
 146. Cirace, supra note 24, at 650-51. This incentive/dissemination conflict is related to the idea 
of externalities. Id. at 651. See infra note 149 and accompanying text for an explanation of why the 
fact that information is a public good leads to concerns about free riding and other market 
imperfections.  
 147. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 61; Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1466-67. 
 148. Cirace, supra note 24, at 657. In other words, the good is necessarily provided in the same 
amount to all the affected customers. VARIAN, supra note 9, at 618.  
 149. Id. at 622-30. Free riding occurs when each person has an incentive to pay as little as possible 
for the use of a good, because he or she is relying on another person to purchase the entire good. Id. at 
622. Public goods are especially prone to free riders because all can enjoy them, even if only one 
purchases them. Id.  
 150. See generally id. 
 151. Cirace, supra note 24, at 657. See also ROSEN, supra note 3, at 69-70 for, an argument that 
efficiency requires the government to use its coercive power to force everybody to pay for public 
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extreme in the case of television programming.152 This situation results 
from the fact that the provision of zero benefits leaves the author with no 
incentive to create.153  
2. Externalities 
The incentive/dissemination conflict is amplified with the existence of 
externalities. An externality has been described as “a divergence between 
private and social cost that occurs ‘when some activity of party A imposes 
a cost or confers a benefit on party B for which party A is not charged or 
compensated by (or through) the price system.’”154 For example, certain 
uses of copyrighted works, such as scholarship, impose an external benefit 
on society in the form of increased knowledge, an educated population, 
and advances in knowledge.155 The externality, however, impedes market 
facilitation of these kinds of socially beneficial transactions.156 Producers 
and disseminators of the knowledge thus receive less income than the total 
social benefit would warrant.157 A reduced incentive to create work, even 
socially desirable work, results from the imbalance between benefit and 
income.158 In Betamax, the dissent suggested that an award of continuing 
royalties might have been an appropriate remedy.159 The problem with 
imposing such a tax on VTR devices was that it would encourage 
overproduction of works (such as TV movies and specials) and would lead 
 
 
goods. If possible, government provision of public goods would avoid the free rider problem while 
ensuring optimal provision of public goods. Id. at 69.  
 152. See infra, Part III.C.2. 
 153. See generally Cirace, supra note 24, at 657-58. 
 154. Id. at 673 (quoting A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 105 (4th ed. 1932)). 
Externalities can be either positive (“external benefits”) or negative (“external costs”), depending on 
the effect to the third party. See VARIAN, supra note 9, at 40-42.  
 155. Gordon, supra note 60, at 1630.  
 156. Id. See also Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 2, at 1466-67 (explaining that authors 
have less incentive to create many socially beneficial inventions because they entail large expenditures 
and high risk that are not recovered due to the low price of unauthorized copying).  
 157. Gordon, supra note 60, at 1630-31. 
 158. Id. See also Cirace, supra note 24, at 657. 
 159. Betamax, 464 U.S. 417, 499 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1984) (agreeing with the Ninth 
Circuit’s contention that awarding continuing royalties may be appropriate). The Ninth Circuit stated:  
In [circumstances where an injunction would substantially injure the public interest as well as 
the defendant’s], the property owner may be awarded . . . a reasonable royalty for the further 
use of his property. The courts might well conclude that [the copying practices] involve just 
such a public interest, so that a judicially created compulsory license as a substitute for 
injunctive relief could be found appropriate. 
Universal II, 659 F.2d 963, 976 n.18 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 45, at 
§ 13.05[E][4][e] at 13-91).  
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to an overcompensation of the studios and inefficiency.160 The same 
analysis does not apply to PVR technology, however, because the greater 
control viewers have in content and temporal matters necessarily leads to a 
much greater external benefit, resulting in a significantly reduced incentive 
for television studios to continue producing television programs.161 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The externalities suffered by the television companies are much greater 
if TV shows can now be taped without commercials. The increase in the 
number of people who use PVR devices to watch television shows skews 
advertising and marketing views of television, especially in 
“primetime.”162 Advertisers could be unwilling to pay fully for primetime 
advertising space if more viewers stop watching commercials. An increase 
in the cost of traditional advertising space may result in advertisers 
developing new methods of advertising or focuses, such as product 
placement within TV shows. In addition, this skewed view can lead to 
another problem: the underproduction of works and under-compensation 
to the studios.163 
One possible solution would be a compulsory license or per-unit tax.164 
Instead of imposing a tax on each videotape, a tax would be added to the 
monthly charges, and would then go back to the TV studios. The Ninth 
Circuit has entertained the notion that certain “special circumstances” exist 
in which compulsory licenses or “continuing royalties” are desirable, as 
suggested by Blackmun in his Betamax dissent.165 Because the Betamax 
 
 
 160. Cirace, supra note 24, at 675-79. The Coase Theorem, which helped to found the economic 
analysis of law and won its inventor the Nobel Prize in economics, explains property distribution. 
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 78, at 82-87. The Coase Theorem states that the efficient amount of a 
good involved in an externality is independent of the distribution of property rights. VARIAN, supra 
note 9, at 574. In other words, the initial assignment of a property rights will not affect the ultimate use 
of the property, assuming transaction costs are zero. POSNER, supra note 9, at 8 (citing Ronald H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960)). One general exception to the Coase 
theorem is the high transactions costs case. Cirace, supra note 24, at 675. See also supra note 137 and 
accompanying text for an explanation of the high transaction costs case. 
 161. See generally Gordon, supra note 60, at 1630-31. 
 162. Bower, supra note 99, at 441. Primetime is consistently the most important time offered to 
advertisers. Id. (citing Michael Lewis, supra note 104, at 36). 
 163. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of the 
underproduction of goods in this context. 
 164. A compulsory license scheme mandates that an intended user of copyrighted work obtain a 
license from the copyright holder. Hyman, supra note 53, at 107. 
 165. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988). In Abend, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that an injunction prohibiting the owners of a film from exhibiting it could cause “great 
injustice,” and that a “continuing royalty would constitute an acceptable resolution for infringement 
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court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s Universal II holding on the liability 
issue, and refused to speak to the remedy issue, the Ninth Circuit’s 
contention that continuing royalties are appropriate in certain cases is still 
valid law.166 
A compulsory license scheme resembles an implied contract between a 
copyright holder and a user in that it allows the user unlimited use of the 
product in return for a fee or royalty, or a promise to pay the fee at a later 
date.167 In essence, the monthly tax would be payment for permission to 
use the copyright. A tax may compensate for the externalities and result in 
an efficient balance of production and advertising. Such a tax places the 
burden on consumers. If consumers are willing to bear the cost for the 
added service, then the transaction is efficient. Commentators have noted 
that compulsory licensing is appropriate either when “‘technology has 
created new uses for which the author’s exclusive rights have not been 
clearly established . . . [or] when technology has made old licensing 
methods for established rights ponderous or inefficient.’”168 Arguably, the 
major advances in recording technology offered by both TiVo and 
ReplayTV constitute either, if not both, of the aforementioned categories.  
If the Supreme Court is faced with the issue whether manufacture and 
use of PVRs to record television programs constitutes copyright 
infringement, it should decline to extend the Betamax holding, and instead 
hold that use of PVRs to record copyrighted shows constitutes copyright 
infringement. In addition, the Court should grant the studios relief 
analogous to the relief which Blackmun saw fit in 1984: a compulsory 
license, or a per-unit tax.  
V. CONCLUSION 
After Betamax, makers and distributors of video tape recorders gained 
the freedom to continue designing and manufacturing improved devices 
for recording television programs and watching those programs at a later 
 
 
caused by in-home taping of television programs by VCR—‘time-shifting.’” Id.  
 166. See generally Abend, 863 F.2d 1479. The Betamax court concluded its opinion with the 
determination that Sony’s sale of VTRs did not constitute contributory copyright infringement, and did 
not approach the issue of appropriate remedy. Betamax, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).  
 167. Hyman, supra note 53, at 107. Four statutory provisions imposing compulsory licenses to 
protect jukeboxes, public broadcasting, cable television, and copyrighted music include 17 U.S.C. 
§ 116 (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000); and 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). See also 
Hyman, supra note 53, at 108-09.  
 168. Hyman, supra note 53, at 108 (quoting Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of 
Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 209) (1982).  
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time.169 Mechanical limitations to the VTR, however, allowed television 
studios to benefit from the VTR’s capabilities because although more 
people were using the device to time-shift, they could not completely 
avoid watching the commercials within the recorded television shows.170 
As a result, the studios realized greater potential for advertising revenue,171 
and thus were not harmed sufficiently to warrant the relief they wanted 
from the Supreme Court.172 Recording devices have advanced to the point, 
however, where complete elimination of the commercial advertisements is 
not only possible, but also easy.173  
In light of such advancing technologies, yet taking into account the 
economic rationale behind the Betamax line of cases, it would be 
economically inefficient to extend the Betamax holding, and the fair use 
doctrine, to apply to PVRs.174 First, the public goods problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that television programs are becoming easier to 
copy, but more costly to produce.175 Second, the incentive/dissemination 
conflict is more intrusive in the case of PVRs; producers’ incentives to 
create television programs and studios’ incentives to air them decrease due 
to the possibly substantial decrease in advertising revenue, which results 
from the PVR’s ability to allow people to skip commercials.176 This 
problem was absent from the time-shifting context of the Betamax case.177 
As a result of the decrease in advertising revenue, the external benefits 
imposed on the viewers of copyrighted works are beginning to outweigh 
the benefits realized by the producers of television programs.178 The 
combination of the public goods problem, the incentive/dissemination 
conflict, and the externalities could result in substantial revenue loss for 
television studios, decreased resources with which to produce shows, and 
overall decreased quality in television programming.179 The ability of 
viewers to eliminate completely commercials is a change that the Supreme 
Court in 1984, based on its rationale in Betamax, failed to anticipate in its 
 
 
 169. For example, TiVo and SonicBlue have continued to develop digital video recording devices. 
See supra Part II.C. 
 170. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra Part II.C. 
 174. See supra Part III.C. 
 175. See supra notes 119, 147-50 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra Part III.C. 
 177. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 178. See supra Part III.C. 
 179. See supra Part III.C. 
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holding.180 The dissent, suggesting that an award of continuing royalties 
would be appropriate relief for the injured television studios,181 better 
reflects the rationale needed in the current state of technological advances. 
A compulsory license, therefore, or a per-unit tax on either the price of a 
PVR device or the monthly service fee, is an appropriate and socially 
desirable remedy to ensure the continued high quality of television 
programming. 
Maribel Rose Hilo* 
 
 
 180. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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